We present a formalization and a formal total correctness proof of a MiniSATlike SAT solver within the system Isabelle/HOL. The solver is based on the DPLL procedure and employs most state-of-the art SAT solving techniques, including the conflict-guided backjumping, clause learning, and the two-watched unit propagation scheme. A shallow embedding into Isabelle/HOL is used and the solver is expressed as a set of recursive HOL functions. Based on this specification, the Isabelle's built-in code generator can be used to generate executable code in several supported functional languages (Haskell, SML, and OCaml). The SAT solver implemented in this way is, to our knowledge, the first fully formally and mechanically verified modern SAT solver.
Introduction
The propositional satisfiability problem (SAT) is the problem of deciding if there is a truth assignment under which a given propositional formula (in conjunctive normal form) evaluates to true. It is a canonical NP-complete problem [Coo71] and it holds a central position in the field of computational complexity. The SAT problem is also important in many practical applications such as electronic design automation, software and hardware verification, artificial intelligence, and operations research. Thanks to recent advances in propositional solving technology, SAT solvers are becoming the tool for attacking more and more practical problems. Most modern SAT solvers are based on the DavisPutnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) procedure [DP60, DLL62] and its modifications.
Since SAT solver are used in applications that are very sensitive (e.g., software and hardware verification), their misbehavior could be both financially expensive and dangerous from the aspect of security. Clearly, having a trusted SAT solving system is vital. This can be achieved in two different ways.
1. One approach is to extend an online SAT solver with the possibility of generating models of satisfiable formulas and proofs of unsatisfiability for unsatisfiable formulas. The generated models and proofs are then checked offline by an independent trusted checker [ZM03, Gel07] . 2. Another approach is to apply software verification techniques and verify the implementation of the SAT solver itself, so that it becomes trusted [LS08, SV08, Mar09a] .
The first approach has successfully been used in recent years. It is relatively easy to implement, but it has some drawbacks. Generating object-level proofs introduces about 10% overhead to the solver's running time and proof checking can also take significant amount of time [Gel07] . More importantly, since proofs are very large objects, they can consume up to several gigabytes of storage space. Since proof checkers have to be trusted, they must be very simple programs so that they could be ,,verified" only by manually inspecting their source code [Gel07] . On the other hand, in order to handle large proof objects, checkers must use specialized functionality of the underlying operating system, which reduces the level of their confidence.
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In this work we take the second, harder, approach and formally verify a full implementation of a SAT solver. There are several reasons for doing this.
1. We believe that this verification effort could help in better theoretical understanding of how and why modern SAT solver procedures work. 2. Verified SAT solvers can serve as the trusted kernel checkers for verifying results of other untrusted verifiers such as BDDs, model checkers, and SMT solvers [SV08] . Also, verification of some SAT solver modules (e.g., Boolean constraint propagation) can serve as a basis for creating a verified, yet efficient, proof checker for SAT. 3. The overheads of generating and storing unsatisfiability proofs can be avoided if the SAT solver itself is trusted. 4. We hope that this work contributes to the Verification Grand Challenge [VSTTE] , and adds to the growing collection of non-trivial software that has been fully formally verified.
In order to prove the correctness of a SAT solver implementation, it needs to be formalized in some meta-theory so its properties can be analyzed by using an appropriate mathematical apparatus. In order to achieve the desired, highest level of trust, formalization in a classical "pen-and-paper" fashion is not satisfactory and a mechanized and machine-checkable formalization is required.
Results presented in this paper constitute a significant part of our SAT verification project [MJ09c] , illustrated in Figure 1 . All formalizations done within the project were made within the system Isabelle/HOL [NPW02] .
2 As a part of this project, abstract state transition systems for SAT [KG07, NOT06] have been formalized. Following these formalizations, we have implemented a modern SAT solver ArgoSAT 3 in C++. Since formal verification of the real C++ code was beyond of our reach, we have developed a corresponding SAT solver description in an imperative pseudo-language, within a tutorial on the modern SAT solving technology [Mar09a] . This description (obtained from an executable SAT solver) was semi-mechanically verified using Hoare logic (verification conditions were manually generated and then verified within Isabelle/HOL) [Mar09a] .
In the current paper, a different approach is pursued. A shallow embedding into HOL is used, i.e., the SAT solver is expressed as a set of recursive functions in HOL (which is, for this purpose, treated as a pure functional programming . From this specification, an executable SAT solver in several functional languages (e.g., Haskell, SML, OCaml) can be automatically extracted.
The extracted solver achieves much higher level of trust, since the whole formalization is done within the theorem prover. In addition to this important conceptual difference, this paper also brings a formal proof of termination of a modern solver, not previously given.
In the rest of the paper, a full, self-contained, implementation of a SAT solver within Isabelle/HOL will be presented. However, some familiarity with modern SAT solving technology is assumed (the reader can consult tutorials given in the literature [BHMW09, Mar09a, GKSS07, ES04] ).
Overview of the paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In §2 we give some background information about the DPLL procedure and its modifications. We also give some background on program verification. In §3 we introduce basic notions of the system Isabelle and formulate an underlying theory for our formalization. The central section of the paper is §4 in which we present the specification of the SAT solver and introduce correctness conditions along the way. In §5 we outline the correctness proof of our implementation and in §6 we discuss some aspects of the proof management. In §7 we list some of the related work, in §8 we list some possible directions for further work, and in §9 we draw final conclusions.
Background
DPLL Procedure and its Modifications. Most modern SAT solvers are based on the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) procedure. Its original recursive version is shown in Figure 2 , where F denotes a set of propositional clauses tested for satisfiability and F [l → ⊤] denotes the formula obtained from F by substituting the literal l with ⊤, its opposite literal l with ⊥, and simplifying afterwards. A literal is pure if it occurs in the formula but its opposite literal does not occur. A clause is unit if it contains only one literal. This recursive implementation is practically unusable for larger formulae and therefore it is not used in modern SAT solvers, nor in this paper. Starting with the work on the GRASP and SATO systems [MSS99, Zha97] the spectacular improvements in the performance of DPLL-based SAT solvers achieved in the last years are due to (i) several conceptual enhancements of the original DPLL procedure, such as backjumping (a form of non-chronological backtracking), conflict-driven lemma learning, and restarts, (ii) advanced heuristic components (e.g., literal selection strategies) and (iii) better implementation techniques, such as the two-watched literals scheme for unit propagation. These advances make it possible to decide satisfiability of some industrial SAT problems with tens of thousands of variables and millions of clauses.
Abstract state transition systems for SAT. During the last few years two state transition systems which model modern DPLL-based SAT solvers and related SMT solvers have been published [NOT06, KG07] . These descriptions define the top-level architecture of solvers as a mathematical object that can be grasped as a whole and fruitfully reasoned about. Both systems are accompanied by pen-and-paper correctness and termination proofs. Although they succinctly and accurately capture all major aspects of the solvers' global operation, they are still high level and far from the actual implementations. Both systems model the solver behavior as transitions between states that represent the values of global variables of the solver. These include the set of clauses F and the corresponding assertion trail M . Transitions between states are performed only by using precisely defined transition rules. The solving process is finished when no transition rule applies and final state is reached.
The system of Nieuwenhuis et al. [NOT06] is very coarse. It can capture many different strategies seen in the state-of-the art SAT solvers, but this comes at a price. Several important aspects still have to be specified in order to build the implementation based on the given set of rules.
The system of Krstic and Goel [KG07] gives a more detailed description of some parts of the solving process (particularly the conflict analysis phase) than the previous one. Since this system is used as a basis of the implementation given in this paper, we list its transition rules in Figure 3 . Together with the formula F and the trail M , the state of the solver is characterized by the conflict analysis set C which is either the set of literals or the distinguished symbol no cflct. The
Figure 3: Rules of dpll as given by Krstić and Goel [KG07] input to the system is an arbitrary set of clauses F 0 , modeled as initial state in which F = F 0 , M = [ ], and C=no cflct. The rules have guarded assignment form: above the line is the condition that enables the application of the rule, below the line is the update to the state variables.
Formal program verification. Formal program verification is the process of proving that a computer program meets its specification which formally describes the expected program behavior. Early results date back to 1950's and pioneers in this field were A. Turing, J. von Neumann and J. McCarthy. In the late 1960's R. Floyd introduced equational reasoning on flowcharts for proving program correctness and T. Hoare introduced axiomatic semantics for programming constructs. Following the lessons from major software failures in recent years, an increasing amount of effort is being invested in this field.
To achieve the highest level of trust, mechanically checkable formal proofs of correctness are required. Many fundamental algorithms and properties of data structures have been formalized and verified in this way. Also, lot of work has been devoted to formalization of programming language semantics, compilers, communication protocols, security protocols, etc. Many of early results in mechanical program verification were carried out by Boyer and Moore using their theorem prover. Theorem provers that are most commonly used for program verification nowadays are Isabelle, HOL, Coq, PVS, Nuprl, etc. A large collection of formalized theories (of both pure mathematics and computer science) mechanically checked by the theorem prover Isabelle is available in Archive of formal proofs (http://afp.sourceforge.net).
Formal program verification by shallow embedding into HOL. Shallow embedding into higher-order logic is a technique that is widely used for verifica-tion, despite its well-known limitations [BKH + 08] . This success is due in part to the simplicity of the approach: a formal model of the operational or denotational semantics of the language is not required and many technical difficulties (e.g., the representation of binders) are avoided altogether. Furthermore, the proof methods used are mainly standard induction principles and equational reasoning, and no specialized program logic (e.g., Hoare logic) is necessary. The specifications may be turned into executable code directly by means of code generation [Haf08] . The main drawback of this approach is that all programs must be expressed as purely functional. As the notion of side-effect is alien to the world of HOL functions, programs with imperative updates of references or arrays cannot be expressed directly which heavily effects the efficiency of the generated code. Still, approaches to overcome these difficulties have been proposed recently [BKH + 08].
Underlying Theory
In order to create and reason about the correctness of a SAT solver, we have to formally define some basic notions of propositional logic. The full formalization has been made in higher-order logic of the system Isabelle and basic knowledge about this system is assumed in the rest of the paper. We will use a syntax similar to the syntax used in Isabelle/HOL. Formulas and logical connectives of this logic (∧, ∨, ¬, −→, ←→) are written in the usual way. Function applications are written in prefix form, as in (f x 1 . . . x n ). Existential quantification is denoted by ∃ x. ... and universal quantification by ∀ x. ....
We assume that the underlying theory we are defining includes the theory of ordered pairs, lists, (finite) sets, and optional data-types (all of them are built-in in Isabelle/HOL). We also assume that record data-types are available. Syntax of these operations is summarized in the first column of Figure 4 and the semantics is informally described in the second column.
Basic types. Apart from the basic built-in types, we introduce the types used in propositional logic of CNF formulas as given by Definition 1. e is a member of the set set set 1 ∪ set 2 the set union of set 1 and set 2 |set | the number of elements in the set set ′ a option the type of optional values of the type ′ a Some a the optional value exists and is a None the optional value does not exist f (x := y) the mapping obtained from the mapping f by setting the value of x to y rec f1 := a1, . . . , f k := a k the record obtained from the record rec by setting the values of fields f1, . . . , f k to values a1, . . . , a k , respectively For the sake of readability, we will sometime omit printing types and use the following naming convention: literals (i.e., variables of the type Literal) are denoted by l (e.g., l, l ′ , l 0 , l 1 , l 2 , . . .), variables by vbl , clauses by c, formulae by F , and valuations by v.
Definition 1.
Most of the following definitions are formalized by using primitive recursion, so that they can be used to generate executable code. However, in order to simplify the presentation and improve readability we give their characterizations in an informal way and omit the Isabelle code.
Definition 2. The opposite literal of a literal l, denoted l, is defined by: Pos vbl = Neg vbl, Neg vbl = Pos vbl.
We abuse the notation and overload some symbols. For example, the symbol ∈ denotes both set membership and list membership. It is also used to denote that a literal occurs in a formula.
Symbol vars is also overloaded and denotes the set of variables occurring in a clause, in a formula, or in a valuation.
Definition 4. The set of variables that occur in a clause c is denoted by (vars c). The set of variables that occur in a formula F is denoted (vars F ). The set of variables that occur in a valuation v is denoted (vars v).
The semantics is introduced by the following definitions.
We will write v l to denote that l is not true in v (note that it does not mean that l is false in v), v c to denote that c is not true in v, and v F to denote that F is not true in v. We will say that l (or c, or F ) is unsatisfied in v.
We will write v ¬ l to denote that l is not false in v, v ¬ c to denote that c is not false in v, and v ¬ F to denote that F is not false in v. We will say that l (or c, or F ) is unfalsified in v.
Definition 7. A valuation v is inconsistent, denoted (inconsistent v), iff it contains both literal and its opposite i.e., iff ∃l.
Definition 8. A model of a formula F is a consistent valuation under which F is true. A formula F is satisfiable, denoted (sat F ), iff it has a model i.e.,
Definition 10. Formulae F 1 and F 2 are logically equivalent, denoted F 1 ≡ F 2 , iff any model of F 1 is a model of F 2 and vice versa, i.e., iff F 1 F 2 and F 2 F 1 .
, and for each literal
Definition 13. The resolvent of clauses c 1 and c 2 over the literal l, denoted
Definition 14. A clause c is a tautological clause, denoted (clauseTautology c), if it contains both a literal and its opposite (i.e., ∃ l. l ∈ c ∧ l ∈ c).
Definition 15. The conversion of a valuation v to a formula v is the list that contains all single literal clauses made of literals from v.
Assertion Trail. In order to build a non-recursive implementation of the dpll algorithm, the notion of valuation should be slightly extended. During the solving process, the solver should keep track of the current partial valuation. In that valuation, some literals are called decision literals. Non-decision literals are called implied literals. These check-pointed sequences that represent valuations with marked decision literals will be stored in the data structure called the assertion trail. All literals that belong to the trail will be called asserted literals.
The assertion trail operates as a stack and literals are always added and removed from its top. We extend the underlying theory with the type LiteralTrail, as given by Definition 16:
LiteralTrail a list of literals, with some of them marked as decision literals.
We will denote variables of the type LiteralTrail by M (e.g., M, M ′ , M 0 , . . .).
. The symbol + is written instead of the constructor Pos, the symbol − instead of Neg and the decision literals are marked with the symbol | on their left hand sides.
A trail can be implemented, for example, as a list of (Literal, bool) ordered pairs and all following definitions will be based on this specific implementation. Our SAT solver implementation effectively uses the LiteralTrail datatype and so we also show its Isabelle formalization. The function isLastAssertedLiteral is used to check if the given literal is the last asserted literal of the given clause in the given valuation.
The function getLastAssertedLiteral is used to detect the last asserted literal of the given clause in the given valuation. 
SAT Solver Formalization
In this section we will present a formalized implementation of a SAT solver within the underlying theory introduced in Section 3. Different concepts and algorithms will be described in separate subsections. Together with the solver implementation we will give conditions that describe its variables and their relationships that must be invariant for the solver functions. These invariants fully characterize the role of some variables in the system and help understanding the whole system. Because invariants are listed simultaneously with the implementation, the style used can be seen as implementation driven by its specification.
Note that the following solver description is very formal and concise, and that some previous knowledge about the SAT solving technology is assumed. Useful tutorial descriptions can be found in the literature (e.g., [BHMW09, Mar09a, GKSS07, ES04]).
Solver State
In an imperative or object-oriented language, the state of the solver is represented by using global or class variables. Functions of the solver access and change these variables as their side-effects. In HOL, functions cannot have side-effects, so the solver state must be wrapped up in a record and passed around with each function call. Therefore, all functions in our functional implementation will receive the current solver state as their last parameter and return the modified state along with their result. However, function definitions will use monadic Haskell-style do syntax recently supported by Isabelle/HOL [BKH + 08] and hide explicit state changes. For each component XXX of the state basic operations readXXX and updateXXX will be provided.
The state of the solver is represented by the following record:
record State = "getSATFlag" :: ExtendedBool "getF"
:: Formula "getM" :: LiteralTrail "getConflictFlag" :: bool "getConflictClause" :: pClause "getQ"
:: "Literal list" "getReason"
:: "Literal ⇒ pClause option" "getWatch1"
:: "pClause ⇒ Literal option" "getWatch2"
:: "pClause ⇒ Literal option" "getWatchList"
:: "Literal ⇒ pClause list" "getC"
:: Clause "getCl"
:: Literal "getCll"
:: Literal
The data-type pClause is just a synonym for nat and it indicates "pointers" to clauses i.e., indices of clauses in the clause list representing the formula.
Basic variables of the solver state are the following.
-The variable SATFlag reflects the status of the solving process and it remains Undef until the formula which is being solved is detected to be satisfiable (when SATFlag is set to True) or to be unsatisfiable (when SATFlag is set to False). Its characterization will be the main partial correctness result and it will be proved in Section 5.
Inv[SATFlag]
4 :
where F 0 is the formula tested for satisfiability.
-The literal trail M contains the current partial valuation (i.e., M is the current partial valuation). It is characterized by the following invariants:
which ensure that M also represents a mapping of some variables to their truth values.
The trail M contains literals whose variables are in the initial formula F 0 and literals whose variables are in the special set of decision variables (denoted by decisionVars and used in decide operation formalized in Section 4.6). Note that these two sets usually coincide, but this is not necessarily the case. This domain property of M is given by the following invariant.
The formula F will be referred to as the current set of clauses. It changes during the solving process and its clauses are either (simplified) clauses of the initial formula F 0 or its consequences that are learned during the 4 We will say that a state satisfies an invariant and that invariant holds in a state if the components (getXXX) of the state satisfy the condition given by the invariant.
solving process. Since initial clauses are built from literals of F 0 and learned clauses are built from literals of M , the formula F satisfies the following domain property.
Inv[Fvars] :
(vars F
is automatically satisfied when l is asserted. To ensure correctness, once these literals are added to M , they must never get removed from it. This is the case in the implementation we provide, since all these literals will be asserted at the decision level zero of the trail M which never gets backtracked.
As said, all clauses in F are logical consequences of F 0 . Also, the decision level zero of the trail M contains literals that are logical consequences of the formula F 0 . The following invariant describing the relation between the initial formula F 0 , the formula F , and the trail M plays a very important role in the soundness and completeness of the solving process. It states that the formula F 0 is fully characterized by the formula F and the decision level zero of the trail M .
Inv[equivalent] :
The fact that F contains only clauses with two or more different literals also simplifies the implementation of the two-watched literal scheme (see Section 4.4.1).
Other components of the solver state are used in specific phases of the solving process and will be explained in the following sections.
Initialization
In this section we describe the process of initializing the solver state by the given formula F 0 tested for satisfiability.
The function initialize calls addClause for each clause in F 0 which appropriately updates the solver state. Before we introduce the function addClause, we define an auxiliary function removeFalseLiterals used to simplify clauses. It removes all literals from the given clause that are false in the given valuation. The function addClause (called only by initialize) preprocesses the clause by removing its repeated literals and removing its literals that are false in the current trail M . After this, several cases arise.
-If the clause is satisfied in the current trail M , it is just skipped. The rationale for this is that if there is a satisfying valuation for F 0 , it will be an extension of the current trail M , so it will also satisfy the clause that was skipped.
-If the clause is empty after preprocessing, the formula F 0 is unsatisfiable and SATFlag is set to False, since the empty clause cannot be satisfied in any valuation.
-Tautological clauses (i.e., clauses containing both a literal and its opposite) are also skipped since they can always be satisfied.
The two remaining cases actually update F or M . 
Top Level Solver Operation
The only function of the solver that end-users are expected to call is the function solve. First it performs initialization and then it performs the main solver loop while the status of the solving process (given by the variable SATFlag) is Undef. The first time SATFlag changes, the main solver loop stops and the current value of SATFlag is the final solver result. Note that the solve loop is defined by general recursion, so its termination is not trivial and it will be discussed later.
The body of the solver loop begins with a round of exhaustive unit propagation. After that, four different cases arise.
1. It has been detected that M ¬ F . In that case we say that a conflict occurred.
(a) If there are no decision literals in M , we say that a conflict at decision level zero occurred and it is determined that the formula F 0 is unsatisfiable. In that case, SATFlag is set to False. (b) If there are some decision literals in M , then the conflict analysis and resolving procedure is performed (see Section 4.7). 2. It has been detected that M ¬ F .
(a) If all variables from the fixed variable set decisionVars are defined in the current trail M , it is determined that the formula is satisfiable.
In that case, SATFlag is set to True. The set decisionVars must meet additional requirements in order to guarantee soundness of this conclusion. For example, it suffices that (vars F 0 ) ⊆ decisionVars, as it is the case in our implementation. (b) If there are some decision variables that are undefined in M , a new decision is made (see Section 4.6) and a decision literal is asserted.
The detection of clauses of F that are false in M or unit in M must be done efficiently so that it does not become the bottleneck of the whole solver. An optimized way to achieve this is given in Section 4.4. 
Conflict and Unit Clause Detection
Each time a literal is added to M , the formula F is checked for existence of unit or false clauses. Results of this check are stored in the following state variables.
-The variable conflictFlag is set when it is determined that the current set of clauses F is false in the valuation M . The invariant that fully characterizes it is:
conflictFlag ←→ M ¬ F -The number conflictClause is the index of a clause in F that is false in the valuation M . Its defining invariant is:
-The list Q is a list of all literals that are unit literals for clauses in F which are unit clauses with respect to the valuation M . These literals are ready to be asserted in M as a result of the unit propagation operation. The unit propagation queue Q is fully characterized by the following invariant.
Inv[QDef ]
:
Note that this condition guarantees the completeness for unit propagation i.e., it guarantees that all unit literals for unit clauses in F are contained in Q. This is not necessary for the soundness nor completeness of the whole procedure, but, if satisfied, leads to better efficiency.
Also, there should be no repeated elements in Q.
Inv[Qdistinct] : (distinct Q)
As Q is built of literals of F its domain (its set of variables) is included in the domain of F .
Inv[Qvars]
(vars Q) ⊆ (vars F 0 ) ∪ decisionVars -The mapping reason maps literals in Q to indices of clauses in F for which they are the unit literals. Since this mapping does not change when the literals from Q get asserted in M , it continues to map nondecision literals of M to indices of clauses in F that are reasons for their propagation. Notice that no reason clauses can be attached to the literals at the decision level zero. This is because literals at the decision level zero have a special role in the solving process, as they can get asserted by propagating single literal clauses which are not explicitly stored in F , as described in Section 4.1. All this is characterized by the following complex invariant.
Inv[reasonDef ]
Two-watched Literal Scheme
An efficient way to check for false and unit clauses is by using the two-watched literal scheme. It introduces the following variables to the state.
• Mappings watch 1 and watch 2 assign two distinguished literals to each clause of F . This condition is imposed through the following invariants.
Inv[watchesEl]
∀c. c < |F | −→ (watch 1 c) = (watch 2 c)
• The mapping watchList assigns to each literal l a list of clause indices in F that represent clauses in which l is a watched literal. This is imposed by the following invariants.
Inv[watchListsDef ]
It also holds that watch lists do not contain repeated clauses.
Inv[watchListsDistinct] :
∀l. (distinct (watchList l))
Next, we describe the function assertLiteral that adds the given literal (either decision or implied) to the trail M . The variables conflictFlag, conflictClause, Q, and reason are then updated by using the two watched literal propagation scheme encoded by the function notifyWatches. Before we introduce and explain the function notifyWatches, we introduce several auxiliary functions.
Functions setWatch1 and setWatch2 promote the given literal to be a new watched literal of the given clause and then add that clause to its watch list 5 . The function swapWatches swaps the two watched literals of the given clause. The function getNonWatchedUnfalsifiedLiteral checks if there is a literal in the given clause, other then its watched literals, which is not false in M . Next, we explain the essence of the two-watched literal scheme encoded in the functions notifyWatches and notifyWatchesLoop. The two-watched literal scheme relies on the fact that a watched literal of a clause can be false in M only when the clause is either true, false or unit in M . In all other cases (when it is undefined and is not unit), both watched literals of the clause are known to be unfalsified. This is formalized by the following invariant (with two instances for i = 1 and i = 2).
Note that the additional conditions imposed on the literal levels are required only for the correctness of backjumping, as described in Section 4.7.
During the assertLiteral operation, the trail M gets extended by a literal l. When this happens, all clauses that do not have l as their watched literal still satisfy the condition of Inv[watchDef ] and they cannot be unit nor false in the extended trail. The only clauses that could have become unit or false are the ones that have l as their watched literal. These clauses are exactly the ones whose indices are contained in (watchList l). The function notifyWatches calls the function notifyWatchesLoop which traverses this list and processes all clauses represented by it. In order to simplify the implementation, for each processed clause index c, watches are swapped if necessary so that it is ensured that (watch 2 c) = l and so (watch 2 c) is false. The following cases may further arise:
1. If it can be quickly detected that the clause F ! c contains a true literal t, there is no need to change its watches, since it satisfies the condition of Inv[watchDef ] for the extended trail. In order to achieve high performance, this check should be done only by using the clause index and other data structures which are most of the time present in the processor cache, without accessing the clause itself. When a literal which was not watched becomes a new (watch 2 c), the literal l stops being the watched literal of c and the clause index c should be removed from its watch list. Since this happens many time during the traversal performed by the notifyWatchesLoop, it turns out that it is more efficient to regenerate the new watch list for the literal l, then to do successive remove operations instead. This is the role of newWl parameter in the notifyWatchesLoop function. The invariants Inv[watchListsDef ] and Inv[watchesEl] together guarantee that for each clause there will always be two watched literals (hence, the missing None branches in the case expressions are indeed not needed).
Unit Propagation
The operation of unit propagation asserts unit literals of unit clauses of F . Since the two-watched literal scheme is complete for false and unit clause detection (as the function assertLiteral preserves Inv[conflictFlagDef ] and Inv[QDef ] ), all unit literals of clauses in F can be found in Q. This makes unit propagation a rather trivial operation -literals are picked from Q and asserted until Q is emptied or until a conflict is detected. Notice that the termination of the exhaustiveUnitPropagate function is nontrivial, since it is defined by using the general recursion and it will be discussed later.
Decision Heuristics
When unit propagation exhausts, no new literal can be inferred and a kind of backtracking search must be performed. This search is driven by the guesses made by the decision heuristic. The heart of the decision heuristic is the selectLiteral function whose role is to pick a literal whose variable is in the fixed set of decision variables decisionVars, but which is not yet asserted in M . The literals are selected based on some given criteria. Many different criteria can be used and experimental evidence shows that this heuristic is often crucial for a solver's performance. However, in this paper we will specify it only by its effect given by the following postcondition.
definition applyDecide :: "Variable set ⇒ State ⇒ State" where "applyDecide decisionVars = do l ← selectLiteral decisionVars; assertLiteral l True done "
Conflict Handling
The conflict handling procedure consists of the conflict analysis, learning and backjumping and it is executed whenever a conflict occurs at a decision level higher then zero (when the conflict occurs at the decision level zero, then the formula is determined to be unsatisfiable). After the conflict handling procedure, a top portion of trail is removed and a non-conflicting state is restored.
Unlike the classic backtrack operation which would remove only the last decision made, the backjump operation performs a form of non-chronological backtracking which undoes as many decisions as possible. Backjumping is guided by a backjump clause, which is a consequence of the formula F 0 and which corresponds to the variable assignment that lead to the conflict. Backjump clauses are constructed in the process called conflict analysis as described in Section 4.7.1. When the backjump clause is constructed, the top literals from the trail M are removed until the backjump clause becomes a unit clause in M . From that point, its unit literal is propagated and the search process continues.
Several components of the solver state are used during the conflict handling procedure.
-The clause C represents the current conflict analysis clause, which becomes the backjump clause once the conflict analysis process is finished. This clause is characterized by the following invariants 6 .
Inv[CFalse]
The following variables represent different aspects of the clause C and are cached in the solver state only for performance reasons.
-The literal C l is the last asserted literal of C in the trail M .
Inv[ClDef ]
-The number C n is the number of literals on the highest decision level of the trail M .
Inv[CnDef ]
Conflict Analysis
In order to implement the conflict analysis procedure, we introduce several auxiliary functions.
The function findLastAssertedLiteral is used to set the value of C l based on the current values of C and M . definition findLastAssertedLiteral :: "State ⇒ State" where
The function countCurrentLevelLiterals is used to set the value of C n based on the current values of C and M . Since for some literals asserted at the decision level zero there are no reason clauses in F , it is required that the clause C does not contain literals from the decision level zero. Also, it is reasonable to require that the clause C does not contain repeated literals. The function setConflictAnalysisClause sets the clause C to the given one, but first it preprocesses it by removing duplicates and literals asserted at decision level zero. It also caches the values of C l and C n . The conflict analysis algorithm can be described as follows:
-The conflict analysis process starts with a conflict clause itself (the clause of F that is false in M ) and the clause C is initialized to it. The function applyConflict initializes the clause C to the current conflict clause. Notice that Inv[reasonDef ] guarantees that each propagated literal has an assigned reason clause and that the missing None branch in the case expression is not necessary.
-The conflict analysis procedure we implemented always explains the last asserted literal of C and the procedure is repeated until the isUIP condition is fulfilled, i.e., until there is exactly one literal in C such that all other literals of C are asserted at strictly lower decision levels. This condition can be easily checked by examining the value of C n . The implementation of this technique is given by the function applyExplainUIP. Notice that this function is defined by general recursion so its termination is non-trivial and it will be discussed later.
Learning
During the learning process, redundant clauses that are logical consequences of the initial formula F 0 are learned. Learned clauses containing multiple literals are added to the F , while single literal clauses extend the level zero of the trail M . In our implementation (as it is often the case in modern SAT solvers), the only clauses that are being learned are the backjump clauses. Since we require that all clauses in F have more than two different literals, if a backjump clause C contains only one literal, then learning is not explicitly performed (it is performed implicitly as a part of the backjumping operation). The implementation of learning is given by the function applyLearn. After extending F by C, the watch literals for the clause C are set in a way which ensures Inv[watchDef ]. In the same time, the literal C ll is computed and cached. 
Backjumping
The backjump operation consists of removing literals from M up to a minimal level in which the backjump clause C becomes a unit clause, after which its unit literal C l is propagated. This level is found by using the function getBackjumpLevel. The function applyBackjump performs the backjump operation itself. Notice that after taking the prefix of M , it is concluded that conflict has been successfully resolved (so conflictFlag is unset), and that there are no unit clauses in F with respect to the taken prefix of M (so Q is cleared). For these conclusions to be valid, it is required that no new decisions are made once M is in a conflicting state. Also, unit propagation has to be exhaustive and no new decisions should be made while there are unit clauses in F . These conditions are imposed by the following invariants.
Inv[noDecisionsWhenConflict] :
Highlights of the Total Correctness Proof
The invariants listed in Section 4 are sufficient to prove the total correctness of the procedure. Proving that they are preserved by all solver functions was the most involved part of the total correctness proof. These proofs are available [Mar08] and we will not list them here.
Next we will describe the techniques used to prove the termination of our main solver function solve. We will also prove its total correctness theorem.
Termination
In the code presented in this paper, only the functions exhaustiveUnitPropagate, explainUIP, and solveLoop are defined by using general recursion and it is not obvious if they are terminating. The only function that end-users of the solver are expected to call directly is the function solve as it is the solver's only entry-point. This means that all three functions defined by general recursion are called only indirectly by the function solve and all parameters that are passed to them are computed by the solver. Therefore, these functions can be regarded to be partial functions and it is not necessary to show that they terminate for all possible values of their input parameters. It suffices to show that they terminate for those values of their input parameters that could actually be passed to them during a solver's execution starting from the initial state.
We use Isabelle's built-in features to model this kind of partiality [Kra08] .
1. Notice that all three functions are defined by using the tail recursion and annotated by the directive tailrec. This is a very important feature, and Isabelle can accept these functions whether they terminate or not. However, in order to generate executable code, the (partial) termination of these functions must be shown. 2. When an n-ary function f is defined by using a general recursion, a predicate f dom which tests if an n-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is in the domain of f (i.e., if f terminates on input (a 1 , . . . , a n )) is automatically generated. If the function definition is annotated by the directive domintros, Isabelle generates a theorem of the form (a 1 , . . . , a n )), for each recursive call f(f 1 (a 1 ), . . . , f n (a n )) in the definition of f, where g is a guard for this recursive call. Until the termination of f is proved i.e., until f is proved to be total, the usual induction scheme theorem for the function f (which would be called f.induct) cannot be proved and used. However, when f is defined a weaker, partial induction scheme theorem (called f.pinduct) is automatically proved. It differs from the usual induction scheme only because it adds the domain predicate f dom both to the induction base and to the induction steps. These domain predicates are then carried over and assumed in all lemmas about the function f which are proved by (the partial) induction. Still, in order to complete the whole correctness proof, at one point they have to be discharged. This is done by proving that all inputs passed to the function f imply the domain predicate.
In our case, we know that invariants are preserved throughout any solver's run and that each state for which our solver functions are called satisfies all given invariants. We show that some of these invariants imply the domain predicates, i.e., that our three functions defined by general recursion terminate for states in which these invariants hold.
As an illustration, we will outline the proof that the function exhaustiveUnitPropagate (p22) terminates if its input satisfies certain invariants.
In order to prove this, we introduce a well-founded ordering of trails such that applications of applyUnitPropagate advances, i.e., decreases the trail, in that ordering. So, let us first define an ordering ≻ lit of marked literals (it is trivially well-founded).
Now we can introduce an ordering of trails, which will be used as a basis for the ordering that we are constructing.
The function applyUnitPropagate decreases the trail in this ordering (trivially, by the definition of lexicographic extension), but, unfortunately, this ordering need not be well-founded. However, since invariants hold in every state during the solver's operation, we can make a restriction of ≻ trail that is also well-founded.
Definition 26.
where {. . .} denotes the multiset of list elements and ≻ M mult is the multiset extension of the ordering ≻ M induced by the list M (e 1 ≻ M e 2 iff e 1 occurs after e 2 in the list M ).
Total Correctness
Total correctness of the solve function is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
Assuming that all invariants hold in each state reached during the solve function execution, the proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following two soundness lemmas, which correspond to the two places in the solver code where SATFlag is changed.
Discussion on Proof Management
Although it is hard to quantify the efforts invested in this work, we can estimate it to be around one man-year. The proof scripts are around 25000 lines of Isabelle code and the generated PDF proof documents are around 700 pages long. These numbers are of course heavily dependent on the indentation style used. Proof-checking time by Isabelle is under 5 minutes on a 1.6GHz/512Mb RAM machine running Linux. We estimate that careful investigation of the proof text and its reorganization mainly by extracting some common parts of different proofs into lemmas could lead to 10-20 percent reductions.
During this verification effort some interesting technical issues arose. In order to make such a large-scale verification effort possible, it was necessary to introduce some kind of modularity to the formalization. The crucial step in this direction was to prove the properties of abstract state transition systems for SAT [NOT06, KG07] and then use these proofs in the correctness proof of the low-level implementation presented here. A good direction to follow would be to define internal data-structures (for example the assertion trail) as abstract data-types (ADT) with some desired properties given axiomatically. Although, unfortunately, this has not been explicitly done in our formalization, this idea has been followed to some extent. Namely, after introducing basic definitions, we showed lemmas that could be regarded as axioms of the ADT and all further proofs relied only on those lemmas, without using the low-level properties of the implementation. This, of course, enables changing the low-level implementation into a more efficient one without changing much of the whole correctness proof. We think that explicit encoding the ADT approach (for example by using typeclasses or locales [NPW02] ) would lead to even more flexible formalization and is a step in a right direction.
When proving properties about recursively defined functions we had a dilemma whether to repeat the same induction scheme in proofs of many similar lemmas (one for each property of the recursive function) or to formulate one bigger lemma that groups all assumptions and conclusions for several properties that are being shown. We took the second approach and reduced the total number of lemmas and the total size of proofs, but the price that had to be payed is that we lost track of which assumptions are effectively used for proving a specific conclusion. For example, most of our high-level lemmas that show that invariants are preserved by the function calls assume that all invariants hold before the function call and show that all invariants hold after the function call. The only way to find out which invariants are necessary to hold before the function call so that a specific invariant holds after it is reading the proof texts which can be a tedious task.
Related work
First steps towards verification of SAT and related SMT solvers have been recently made. Shankar has mechanically proved soundness, completeness, and decidability of propositional logic (by means of a satisfiability solver) [Sha85] . Zhang and Malik have informally proved correctness of a modern SAT solver [ZM03] . Abstract state transition systems [NOT06, KG07] describe high-level operation of modern SAT solvers and authors have informally proved their correctness. Marić and Janičić have mechanically verified the classic DPLL proce-dure by shallow embedding into Isabelle/HOL [MJ09b] . Lescuyer and Conchon have mechanically verified a classic DPLL based SAT solver within the system Coq [LS08] . Shankar and Vaucher have mechanically verified a higher level description of a modern DPLL procedure within the system PVS. Marić has previously given [Mar09a] a tutorial exposure of the modern SAT solving techniques (both high and low level) with correctness properties formulated in a Hoare-style framework and proved (to some extent) mechanically within the system Isabelle.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents a full mechanical proof of the total correctness (soundness, termination and completeness) of a SAT solver implementation that covers both modern high-level SAT solving algorithms (e.g., conflict-driven learning) and low-level implementation techniques (most notably the two-watched literal propagation scheme).
Further Work
The specification of the SAT solver given in this paper is such that a fully executable code in a functional language can be automatically generated from it, providing that an executable decision heuristic is supplied. However, the efficiency of the generated code must still be improved, if we want to get a competitive solver.
First, there are several low-level algorithmic improvements that have to be made. For example, in the current implementation, checking if a literal is true in a trail M requires performing a linear-time scan through the list. Most real-world solvers cache truth values of all literals in an array and so allow a constant time check. Also, the conflict analysis phase is expressed here in a bit more abstract way then in implementations of MiniSat style solvers. Next, some higher-level heuristics have to be implemented more carefully. For example, we have only made tests with a trivial decision heuristic that selects a random undefined literal, but in order to have a usable solver, a more involved decision heuristic (e.g., the MiniSat one) should be used. It would also be useful to implement forgetting and restarting techniques [KG07, NOT06] .
Although these modifications require to invest more work, we believe that they are straightforward. However, the most problematic issue is the fact that because of the pure functional nature of HOL no side-effects are possible and there can be no destructive updates of data-structures. It is possible to adapt the code generator to generate monadic Haskell and imperative ML code which would lead to huge efficiency benefits since it allows mutable references and arrays. We hope that with these modifications, the generated code could become comparable to real-world SAT solvers and this would be the main direction of our further work.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a formalization and a total correctness proof of a MiniSAT-like SAT solver within the system Isabelle/HOL. The solver is based on the DPLL procedure and employs most state-of-the art SAT solving techniques including the conflict-guided backjumping, clause learning and the two-watched unit propagation scheme. The described solver specification can serve as a basis for implementation of an efficient and correct SAT solver. One possible approach for that would be to manually implement a SAT solver (in an imperative programming language) by strictly following the descriptions of the solver given in this paper. However, the highest possible level of trust could be achieved only if fully executable code (in a functional programming language) is automatically generated by using the Isabelle's built-in code generator. Although this has been done, the efficiency of generated code should further be improved and that is the field of our future research. We hope that this work can facilitate better understanding of modern SAT solvers. The final product of this research will be a trusted and efficient SAT solver that can be used either independently or as a kernel for checking results of other untrusted verifiers. We also hope that this work shows that, thanks to recent advances in both automated and semi-automated software verification technology, it is possible to have a fully verified implementation of a very non-trivial software system.
